



arm

Firmware Configuration Framework in TF-A and Chain of Trust

Madhukar Pappireddy, Austin

Manish Badarkhe, Cambridge

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Introduction to fconf

- Fconf: Firmware Configuration Framework
- An abstraction layer for accessing platform specific information(i.e., property)
- Ex: Info about UART, GIC, IO Policies etc.
- Access data by querying for a “property”: `get_value(property)`.
- Streamline how properties are accessed:
 - Either platform specific information
 - Implementation defined data

Introduction to fconf continued

- It allows requesting entity (BLx image) to query for a property without knowing what kind of backing store is used to hold the property:

1. C structure

```
typedef struct uart_serial_config_t {  
    uintptr_t uart_base;  
    uint32_t  uart_clk;  
}  
  
const uart_serial_config_t uart0_config = {  
    .uart_base = 0x1c090000,  
    .uart_clk  = 24000000;  
}
```

2. Macro definition

```
#define UART0_BASE    0x1c090000  
#define UART0_CLK    24000000
```

3. Configuration file(such as dts)

```
v2m_serial0: uart@90000 {  
    compatible = "arm,pl011", "arm,primecell";  
    reg = <0x090000 0x1000>;  
    interrupts = <0 5 4>;  
    clocks = <&v2m_clk24mhz>, <&v2m_clk24mhz>;  
    clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";  
};
```

- Popular source : Device tree source(dts)

Primary motivation behind fconf

- Reduce the source code fragmentation within family of SoCs due to various platform specific definitions.
- Evaluate the feasibility of having common TF-A BL images across multiple compatible platforms.
- Documentation

<https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/components/fconf/index.html>

Design of fconf

- Properties are stored in C data structure: Backward compatible
- Data structures filled with appropriate values once by populate() function
- Platform developer registers the populate() callbacks with fconf statically(build-time)
- Common BLx code calls fconf helper to invoke every populate() function
- Any BLx driver/software can query the property using fconf access API

```
v2m_serial0: uart@900000 {
    compatible = "arm,pl011", "arm,primecell";
    reg = <0x0900000 0x1000>;
    interrupts = <0 5 4>;
    clocks = <&v2m_clk24mhz>, <&v2m_clk24mhz>;
    clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";
};
```

Config file(dts)

populate()

```
#define hw_config__uart_serial_config_getter(prop) \
    uart_serial_config.prop

struct uart_serial_config_t {
    uint64_t uart_base;
    uint32_t uart_clk;
};
```

fconf c data struct

Used in uart console driver by
Invoking access API.

fconf interfaces

- Step 0: (Build/compile time)
 - Register each populate() callback with the framework
 - Ex: FCONF_REGISTER_POPULATOR(HW_CONFIG, uart_config, fconf_populate_uart_config)
- Step 1: (Optional pre-requisite if source is dtb):
 - Load all necessary configuration files(dtb) into memory
 - Ex: fconf_load_config(hw_config)
- Step 2: fconf iterates through all the registered populate() and invokes them
 - Done automatically by the framework in the common code; Invisible to platform developer
- Step 3: Access API for a property:
 - Ex: FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(hw_config, uart_serial_config, base_addr)

fconf interfaces explained:

- FCONF_REGISTER_POPULATOR(a, b, c): A pre-processor macro
 - a : A name(string) which represents configuration type: Ex: “HW_CONFIG”
 - b: Used for debug purposes; Essentially a name representing the property namespace
 - c: populate() callback: In simple terms, a function which parses the dtb to retrieve the value of a property belonging to a node
 - “config_type” is associated with each dtb
 - Helps fconf to make sure populate() is invoked only on appropriate config dtbs
 - Ex: FCONF_REGISTER_POPULATOR(HW_CONFIG, uart_config, fconf_populate_uart_config);

```
#define FCONF_REGISTER_POPULATOR(config, name, callback)
    __attribute__((used, section(".fconf_populator")))
    const struct fconf_populator (name##_populator) = {
        .config_type = (#config),
        .info = (#name),
        .populate = (callback)
    };
```

fconf interfaces explained:

- FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(namespace, sub-namespace, property): A preprocessor macro
 - Namespace loosely represents a collection of group of properties: Ex: “hw_config”
 - Sub-namespace loosely represents a group of related properties: Ex: “uart_serial_config”
 - Property is related to platform data/policy
 - Expands to **namespace__sub-namespace__getter(property)**
 - Responsibility of integrator to define this function call
 - Ex: `base_addr = FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(hw_config, uart_serial_config, uart_base);`

```
struct uart_serial_config_t {
    uint64_t uart_base;
    uint32_t uart_clk;
};

extern struct uart_serial_config_t uart_serial_config;

#define hw_config__uart_serial_config_getter(prop) \
    □uart_serial_config.prop
~
```


Leveraging fconf to move to dynamic configurations

- we aim to enhance trusted firmware(TF-A) by leveraging fconf framework.
- One such idea is to make various statically configured pieces of TF-A into dynamically configured components
- Example: IO Policies, Chain of Trust descriptors, hardware configuration of various devices such as UART, GIC etc.
- Don't relying on hard coded compile time structures or macros
- Extract the platform specific configs using fconf and initialize various components in a BL image during runtime.

A person is sitting on a rock in the foreground, looking up at a starry night sky. The Milky Way galaxy is visible, stretching across the sky from the top left towards the bottom right. The sky is dark blue and black, filled with numerous stars and the colorful dust of the galaxy. The person is silhouetted against the bright stars.

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Chain of Trust using Fconf

Manish Badarkhe, Cambridge


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Agenda

- Authentication Framework
- Chain of Trust statically implemented
- Chain of Trust in device tree
- Populate Chain of Trust
- Fconf APIs used in image verification
- Conclusion
- Resources

Authentication Framework

- Generic Code and I/O
 - load images using I/O framework
 - Authenticate images using AM
- Platform port
 - Specify CoT information for each image
 - Provision to get ROTPK or hash of it
- Modules
 - Verify CoT by using APIs exported by CM, AM and IPM



Chain of Trust descriptors

```
typedef struct auth_img_desc_s {  
    unsigned int img_id;  
    const struct auth_img_desc_s *parent;  
    img_type_t img_type;  
    auth_method_desc_t *const img_auth_methods;  
    auth_param_desc_t *const authenticated_data;  
} auth_img_desc_t;
```

ROTPK/RPTPK Hash

Trusted_boot_fw_cert

Trusted_key_cert

BL2_Image

TB_fw_config

Trusted_boot_fw_cert
BL2_Image
TB_fw_config
Trusted_key_cert
Non_trusted_fw_key_cert
Trusted_fw_key_cert
Non_trusted_os_fw_content_cert
Trusted_os_fw_content_cert
...


Non_trusted_fw_key_cert

Trusted_fw_key_cert

Non_trusted_os_fw_content_cert

Trusted_os_fw_content_cert

auth_img_desc_t *cot_desc[]



CoT device tree binding

```
manifests {
    compatible = "arm, cert-descs";

    trusted_boot_fw_cert: trusted_boot_fw_cert {
        root-certificate;
        image-id = <TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CERT_ID>;
        antirollback-counter = <&trusted_nv_counter>;
        tb_fw_hash: tb_fw_hash {
            oid = TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_HASH_OID;
        };
        tb_fw_config_hash: tb_fw_config_hash {
            oid = TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CONFIG_HASH_OID;
        };
        hw_config_hash: hw_config_hash {
            oid = HW_CONFIG_HASH_OID;
        };
        fw_config_hash: fw_config_hash {
            oid = FW_CONFIG_HASH_OID;
        };
    };

    soc_fw_key_cert: soc_fw_key_cert {
        image-id = <SOC_FW_KEY_CERT_ID>;
        parent = <&trusted_key_cert>;
        signing-key = <&trusted_world_pk>;
        antirollback-counter = <&trusted_nv_counter>;
        soc_fw_content_pk: soc_fw_content_pk {
            oid = SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT_PK_OID;
        };
    };
    .....
}
```

```
images {
    compatible = "arm, img-descs";

    hw_config {
        image-id = <HW_CONFIG_ID>;
        parent = <&trusted_boot_fw_cert>;
        hash = <&hw_config_hash>;
    };


    tb_fw_config {
        image-id = <TB_FW_CONFIG_ID>;
        parent = <&trusted_boot_fw_cert>;
        hash = <&tb_fw_config_hash>;
    };
    .....
}
```

```
non_volatile_counters {
    compatible = "arm, non-volatile-counter";

    #address-cells = <1>;
    #size-cells = <0>;

    trusted_nv_counter: trusted_nv_counter {
        id = <TRUSTED_NV_CTR_ID>;
        oid = TRUSTED_FW_NV_COUNTER_OID;
    };
    .....
}
```

Populate CoT from device tree



```

FCNF_REGISTER_POPULATOR(TB_FW, cot, fconf_populate_cot_descs)
FCNF_REGISTER_POPULATOR(TB_FW, nv_cntrs, fconf_populate_nv_cntrs)
    
```

Fconf APIs usage in image verification

- Get image descriptor
 - FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(tbbr, cot, img_id)
- Get base address of stored trusted NV-counter
 - FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(cot, nv_cntr_addr, TRUSTED_NV_CTR_ID)
- Get base address of stored non-trusted NV-counter
 - FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(cot, nv_cntr_addr, NON_TRUSTED_NV_CTR_ID)

Resources

- Binding Document

<https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/components/cot-binding.html?highlight=chain%20of%20trust>

- CoT in device tree implementation available in release v2.4

<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tag/?h=v2.4>

Conclusion

➤ Pros

- Add image descriptors seamlessly with proper CoT.
- Helps to add descriptors in more readable format.
- Avoids using static initialized buffer and descriptors in the code.

➤ Cons

- Need to allocate memory statically for MAX_NUMBER of descriptors in any case.